Dual-class ownership and the accompanying disproportional control rights are generally perceived as a less efficient, or at the very least, a less profitable ownership structure than a proportional ownership structure. However, the claim that controlling insiders' are primarily motivated by rent-seeking behavior is yet to be established in the literature. We examine how choices made by insiders in dual-class firms (i.e., the controlling shareholders) and by investors vary with both the presence of dual-class ownership and the extent of disproportional control. Specifically, we examine whether capital structure choices made by insiders in dual-class firms and investment choices by institutions are consistent with the rent-seeking behavior. Within the dual-class firms, we examine two sources of disproportional control, namely, the difference between voting rights and cash flow rights and the difference between board election rights and cash flow rights. We find that dual-class firms, as well as firms with higher levels of disproportional control, exhibit significantly higher levels of leverage, a higher fraction of longterm debt, greater likelihood of issuing private debt, and more financial covenants. We also find that dual-class firms have significantly higher levels of institutional ownership. Overall, our evidence supports the view that dual-class ownership can be beneficial to the firm rather than necessarily destroying value for non-controlling shareholders.
Introduction
Sound corporate governance protects shareholders from opportunistic actions by management -the classic agency problem described in Jensen and Meckling [1976] . One governance mechanism that ensures that the interests of all shareholders are fairly taken into account is the principle of proportional ownership, in other words, "one share, one vote." Several ownership structures, however, allow just a few shareholders to control a portion of the votes that is substantially larger than their economic interest, that is, their rights to a firm's cash flows. This separation between voting rights and cash flow rights gives controlling shareholders incentives to expropriate value from minority shareholders ). Recent studies have documented that this divergence can be significant and is in fact growing in the United States (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick [2008] ; Amit and Villalonga [2008] ).
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A growing literature attempts to determine the costs and benefits of the disproportional control associated with dual-class ownership. The divergence of voting and cash flow rights that arises in dual-class firms has been severely criticized for encouraging rent-seeking behavior and is, therefore, deemed an inferior governance choice. The literature argues that concentrated control in the hands of a few promotes distortions in investment decisions, tunneling of resources, inefficiencies in the market for corporate control, and consumption of perks (Bebchuk, Kraakman, and Triantis [2000] ; Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer [2000] ; Grossman and Hart [1988] ; Yermack [2006] ). We refer to this view as the entrenchment hypothesis.
In this paper, we analyze some implications of the disproportional control rights present in dual-class firms. 2 While sound economic theory supports the entrenchment view, concentrated control need not always serve an opportunistic role and could be used in conjunction with other mechanisms 1 Gompers et al. [2008] document that over the period 1995 -2002 six percent of their sample firms have more than one class of common stock. Amit and Villalonga [2008] find that over the period [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] twelve percent of their sample of 515 Fortune 500 firms has more than one class of common stock. 2 In the remainder of the document we use the term "entrenchment" to refer to rent-seeking behavior of insiders in dual class firms. that limit such behavior (such as, debt, discussed later in the paper). In addition, reputation costs (particularly in family firms) and the cost of raising financing are viewed as active deterrents to the self-serving behavior of large shareholders (Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb [2003] ). 3 It is important to clarify at this point that our research question is not whether exogenously assigning a dual-class structure (or disproportional control) is a desirable choice. This is, of course, unlikely to be the case. The existing literature on the determinants of dualclass shares finds that the protection of private control benefits, mostly those by founders, is a Furthermore, in economies such as that of the United States, strong investor protection laws and investor awareness of the potential problems created by concentrated control make the expropriation of non-controlling shareholders more difficult than theory suggests (Adams and Ferreira [2007] ). One plausible defense of dual-class ownership might be that concentrated control is beneficial to shareholders. This is true, for example, to the extent that insiders are more capable of making value-enhancing decisions or react quickly to environmental changes. We call this view the efficiency hypothesis.
The extant empirical literature does not provide conclusive evidence on how disproportional control structures affect firm value; more research is needed to understand the uses and consequences of these control mechanisms (Adams and Ferreira [2007] ). In this paper, we aim to understand whether, on average, the dual-class ownership structure, as well as the disproportional control associated with it, is typically consistent with insider rent-seeking behavior, or whether it can operate as a desirable (i.e., value-enhancing) ownership structure from an economic point of view. We examine two sources of disproportional control that are likely to accompany dual-class stock, namely, the separation between voting rights and cash flow rights and the separation between board election rights and cash flow rights.
primary reason for adopting dual-class shares (DeAngelo and DeAngelo [1985] ; Gompers et al. [2008] ). We exploit non-randomness in the choice of dual class structures to determine whether other non-independent choices support either of the two hypotheses identified above. We recognize, however, that there are likely to be differences between the contracting environments of dual-versus single-class firms, and that these differences are likely to affect the decisions made by insiders in these firms. We control for these differences by using variables and methods that are consistent with the prior literature.
In our analysis, we investigate several key choices available to two classes of economic agents. We examine whether these choices, which are identified and explained below, in firms with and without disproportional control are, on average, consistent with motives of either entrenchment or efficiency. Specifically, we first examine various aspects of capital structure decisions made by insiders in dual-class firms. Second, we examine institutional investors' decisions to invest in dual-class firms. We rely on theoretical arguments (and empirical evidence) in the prior literature to develop and test empirical predictions that help to distinguish between the two hypotheses.
We begin by examining whether significant associations exist between control-enhancing mechanisms in dual-class firms and different aspects of debt financing. We focus on debt because different predictions arise for the relationship between disproportional control and debt-related choices under the entrenchment hypothesis versus the efficiency hypothesis. Under the entrenchment view, firms with rent-seeking shareholders are more likely to shy away from debt financing for the following reasons: (1) to avoid control and monitoring by banks, (2) to avoid pressures associated with the commitment to meet the interest payments (Fama [1980] ; Jensen [1986] ), and (3) to minimize contractual restrictions (e.g., covenants that restrict capital expenditures, acquisitions, etc.) that may interfere with their actions. We also examine whether significant associations exist between dual-class ownership and debt maturity, the probability of issuing private debt, and the number of protective covenants. The literature argues that entrenched insiders are unlikely to choose categories of debt with short maturities because these kinds of debt are monitored more frequently than debt with long maturities (Diamond [1991] ). At the same time, Rajan and Winton [1995] argue that, when there is value to private monitoring, long-term debt with protective covenants is likely to be optimal and improves banks' incentives to exert costly monitoring. Therefore, there seems to be no clear prediction regarding the choice of debt of longer maturity as it is often accompanied by increased covenant restrictions -an unattractive feature for entrenched managers. In sum, under the entrenchment hypothesis, we expect insiders in dual-class firms to opt for less leverage, less private debt, and debt with fewer covenants.
In contrast, under the efficiency view we expect the following: either there will be no significant differences in debt financing between dual-class and single-class firms, or, to the extent divergence of ownership and control causes serious agency problems, (1) dual-class firms will rely on debt financing more extensively, and (2) the use of covenants in debt contracts will be more pronounced in dual-class firms than in single-class firms. We base these predictions on the following arguments. First, ceteris paribus, when conflicts of interest are more severe, as we might expect in dual-class firms, insiders are likely to exploit the disciplining and signaling roles of debt and debt covenants as ways to limit actions that are potentially value expropriating. 4 Note that entrenchment motives may also induce insiders to have higher leverage because they may want to inflate the voting power of their equity stakes and reduce the possibility of takeover attempts (Harris and Raviv [1988] ; Stulz [1988] ). But given that dual class firms are virtually immune to hostile takeovers, the probability of managers over-levering due to this motive is minimal in this case (Gompers, Ishii and Metrick [2008] ). We expect insiders to recognize conflicts of interest and to pre-commit against adverse actions by levering up their capital structure. Second, we expect debt with protective covenants to be a cheaper source of financing because equity investors will be more vulnerable and thus require a higher risk premium. Finally, we expect to find a greater use of private debt in dual class firms because private lenders are typically superior monitors, rely on tighter financial covenants, and generally exercise more control over a company in bad states of the world. All these choices by insiders effectively allocate more power to another party (i.e., debtholders) to discipline and place even tighter restrictions on entrenched management if such management fails to deliver a reasonable performance level.
In our second set of analyses, we investigate levels of institutional ownership in dualclass firms versus single-class firms. Under the entrenchment hypothesis, we expect institutions to shy away from firms in which insiders are more likely to take actions that reduce value for investors in inferior equity shares.
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Our results contribute to the literature on disproportional control. First, we document the relationship between dual-class ownership (including the associated control-enhancing mechanisms) and the structure of debt and provide a rationale for the existence of such a Institutions, for example, are likely to avoid these stocks in light of the "prudence" standards that constrain their investment decisions. Furthermore, given their lack of power to influence corporate decision making in such firms, institutions are likely to avoid these firms if they believe that insiders expropriate non-controlling shareholders. In contrast, under the efficiency hypothesis, we expect institutions to view insider control as desirable and to perceive dual-class firms as attractive investments.
We use a comprehensive sample of dual-class firms constructed between 1995 and 2002 by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick [2008] . Our evidence suggests that disproportional control and the presence of dual-class ownership are positively related to leverage. We also find that dualclass firms have significantly higher fractions of long-term debt, lower fractions of current debt, higher likelihoods of private debt, and greater numbers of financial covenants. We also find that dual-class firms have significantly higher levels of institutional ownership. Both individually and collectively, our results support the conjecture that control-enhancing mechanisms in dual-class firms are not manifestations of rent-seeking behavior, but rather are consistent with valueenhancing choices.
relationship. The capital structure choices in dual-class firms are more consistent with an efficiency explanation than with a rent-seeking explanation. We also document that controlenhancing mechanisms in dual-class firms are associated with higher institutional investment.
Overall, the evidence adds to our understanding of control-enhancing mechanisms in dual-class firms.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses review-related literature and develops hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and discusses summary statistics. Section 4 describes research design and presents the results; we first discuss the analyses for capital structure choices and then present the tests and results for institutional investment. Section 5 concludes the study.
Background, Research Questions, and Empirical Predictions
We start this section by discussing the existing research on dual-class firms and then proceed with developing our hypotheses. We focus our summary of prior research on dual-class firms, given its direct relevance to our research objective. Adams and Ferreira [2007] present a thorough review of the empirical literature and Burkart and Lee [2007] provide a comprehensive discussion of the theoretical literature on disproportional ownership.
Background and Prior Research
While deviation from the "one share, one vote" principle can be achieved through several mechanisms (e.g., differential voting rights, pyramidal structures, crossholdings as well as implicit mechanisms as takeover defenses or fiduciary voting), dual-class shareholding structures constitute one of the most straightforward ways to accomplish this. Not surprisingly, dual-class shareholdings are therefore among the most widely researched control-enhancing mechanisms and are often interpreted as a manifestation of the classic agency problem between owners and managers (Partch [1987] ; Jarrell and Poulsen [1988] ). Separation of ownership and control in dual-class firms also leads to a conflict of interest between large shareholders and small shareholders (Amit and Villalonga [2008] ), giving rise to second type of agency problem. Zingales [1995] and Nenova [2003] document a premium to superior voting shares in the United States, which is interpreted as a proxy for the private benefits of control that large shareholders or insiders can extract. Recent studies show that, among insiders in dual-class firms, founding families are the primary beneficiaries (DeAngelo and DeAngelo [1985] ; Nenova [2001] ; Gompers, Ishii and Metrick [2008] ). For example, Gompers et al. [2008] find that a single major determinant of dual-class status is a firm being named after a person (e.g. Wrigley, or Ford). Such findings highlight the importance of the second type of agency problem mentioned above.
The empirical relationship between disproportional control and firm value or performance (e.g., Tobin's q) is an actively researched topic. Several international studies document a negative relation between firm value and the wedge between cash flow and control rights (La Porta et al. [2002] ; Claessens et al. [2002] ; Lins [2003] ). Other studies look at this relation in United States and find that when disproportional control is measured as a wedge between cash flow and voting rights, control via dual-class shares is associated with a lower Tobin's q, although, the result is not robust to alternative definitions of this wedge (Amit and Villalonga [2008] ).
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A related stream of literature examines stock returns around announcements of dual-class recapitalizations (e.g., Cornett and Vetsuypens [1989] ; Jarell and Poulson [1988] ; Dimitrov and Jain [2006] ). While these studies produce mixed evidence, some find that such recapitalizations create rather than expropriate value for non-controlling shareholders. This finding -namely, that recapitalizations can create value -is not unreasonable given that a significant portion of dual- Gompers et al. [2008] analyze a comprehensive list of dual-class firms in the United States from 1995-to 2002 and find only weak evidence that Tobin's q increases with insider's cash flow rights and decreases with voting rights, as the entrenchment hypothesis would imply.
class firms are family firms, which generally have stronger incentives not to expropriate smaller shareholders (Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb [2003] ). While prior literature suggests that family firms are likely to forgo profits in favor of controlling rents, which can lead to poor performance (Fama and Jensen [1983] ; Shleifer and Vishny [1997] ), there is evidence to suggest that family ownership and control can provide a competitive advantage (Demsetz and Lehn [1985] ). Since a family's wealth is closely linked to firm performance, families have strong incentives to monitor firm managers and maximize firm value. In line with these arguments, recent research finds that, compared to non-family firms, family firms trade at a premium, have relatively higher valuations, and are associated with a lower cost of debt financing (Andersen and Reeb [2003] ).
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In our first set of tests, we investigate the relation between control-enhancing mechanisms present in dual-class firms and capital structure choices. These choices include leverage, debt maturity, reliance on private debt, and the number of financial covenants.
Assuming that insiders with voting control rights determine financing policy, we argue that dualclass firms' financing choices are likely to be different under the entrenchment hypothesis than under the efficiency hypothesis.
Overall, the literature on dual-class ownership, and on disproportional control structures does not provide consistent evidence on how control-enhancing mechanisms impact noncontrolling shareholder value. To better understand the implications of dual-class structures, we follow an approach suggested by Adams and Ferreira [2007] and examine whether certain decisions made by insiders in dual-class firms are consistent with either entrenchment or efficiency motives. We discuss our research questions and hypotheses in the following section.
Empirical Predictions: Capital Structure Decisions
However, prior studies find that while firms with founder-CEOs have higher valuation, those with founder-descendants as CEO have no effect or even a discount in valuation (Adams et al. [2005] and Fahlenbrach [2006] ). 8 In fact, several empirical studies have reported that managerial entrenchment is an important determinant of corporate financial policy. See for example, Morck et al. [1988] ; Berger et al. [1997] .
It is often argued that debt disciplines management, and the literature documents several ways this is achieved. Grossman and Hart [1982] argue that higher debt increases the threat of bankruptcy or loss of firm control and thus creates incentives for managers to exert effort. Higher levels of debt are thus unattractive to rent-seeking managers. Jensen [1986] argues in a similar vein that fixed payments under debt contracts reduce the free cash flow problem and thus limit a manager's ability to waste corporate resources. The literature also argues that insiders with high private benefits of control are likely to avoid debt-holder monitoring. Debt holders usually require direct access to inside information and can impose detailed and tight covenant restrictions on managerial actions (e.g., Nini, Smith, and Sufi [2008] ). Evidence in support of these predictions is provided in Berger, Ofek, and Yermack [1997] , who find that the lack of incentives from either ownership and compensation or active monitoring is associated with lower levels of leverage. Jung, Kim, and Stulz [1996] reach a similar conclusion that the agency costs of managerial entrenchment lead firms to issue equity when debt issuance would be more beneficial.
These observations lead to our first empirical prediction. Under the entrenchment hypothesis, we expect dual-class firms to rely on debt financing less heavily. In addition, we also expect that, conditional on the presence of dual-class status, excessive voting or board election rights will be associated with lower levels of debt financing.
While early studies emphasize the disciplining role of debt, more recent studies also recognize that more specific features in debt contracts, such as debt maturity, play an important role in reducing agency conflicts (e.g., Diamond [1991] ; Barclay and Smith [1995] ; Stohs and Mauer [1996] ). The general consensus in this body of research is that short-term debt reduces discretionary funds and subjects managers to the more frequent scrutiny of financial markets, which in turn curbs managers' potentially self-serving behavior. Consistent with this view, Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman [2005] find that managers with fewer equity-based incentives employ long-term debt, while Benmelech [2006] shows that entrenched managers are less likely to use short-term debt. In contrast, Rajan and Winton [1995] argue that short-term debt can provide bondholders with decreased incentives to monitor. In essence, the use of long-term debt and associated covenants increases the banks' incentives to acquire and use additional information to monitor the borrower.
There is no clear-cut prediction with respect to maturity of debt under the entrenchment versus efficiency views. Note, that even a benevolent manager who has strong need for autonomy is likely to choose longer term debt financing. While short term debt allows more frequent monitoring, it also is likely to give lenders too much power, leading to excessive liquidations (Rajan and Winton [1995] ; Diamond [1991] ; Diamond [1993] ).
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Most long term debt will have at least some debt holder protective covenants and we expect that the importance and use of covenants to increase as the fraction of long term debt increases (we empirically verify the presence of high correlation between the two). On the contrary, most short term debt has no covenants because of their higher priority and lower risk of value expropriation. Covenants give bondholder control over certain managerial actions, such as capital expenditures (Nini, Sufi, Smith, 2008) and, can interfere and cause managers to relinquish control in cases of technical default. Entrenched managers are thus expected to avoid covenants and we predict lower fractions of long-term and higher fractions of short term debt under the entrenchment hypothesis. In addition, entrenched managers should avoid private debt as it is known to rely on tighter and more detailed covenants (Smith and Warner [1979] ; Dichev and Furthermore, in dual-class firms, insiders are likely to have longer horizons (e.g., families pass on the firm to successive generations). Stein [1988; 1989] argues that shareholders with longer investment horizons are less likely to forego profitable investments, while Francis and Smith [1995] show that firms with concentrated control are more innovative, and better in timing of long-term investment projects.
To the extent that insiders in dual-class firms make longer term investments, it is not unreasonable for them to match debt maturity with project horizons.
Skinner [2002] ; Nini, Smith and Sufi [2008] ). In contrast, our predictions are different under the efficiency view. Rajan and Winton [1995] argue that when there is value to private monitoring, long term loans with covenants are optimal. Since agency conflicts become more acute in dual class firms and firms with disproportional control, we expect these firms to rely on longer term debt, use private debt and rely on covenants more extensively in case dual-class ownership choice is not driven by rent seeking but is to the benefit of shareholders.
Empirical Predictions: Institutional Investment
In our second set of analyses, we investigate the relation between dual class control enhancing mechanisms and institutional investment. Institutional investors form a large class of investors in the U.S., who are considered to be more sophisticated in terms of making informed investment decisions. It needs to be pointed out that, in general, outside investors can only purchase shares with the inferior voting rights, and most of the shares with the superior voting power are not traded. In the cases where they are traded, these shares are primarily held by insiders (Gompers, Ishii and Metrick [2008] ) and thus are not owned by institutions. As a result, institutional investors in dual-class firms have limited control rights, even when their fractional ownership may give them substantial cash flow rights.
There are several reasons why dual-class share structures are likely to affect institutional investment. If control mechanisms in dual-class firms primarily reflect rent-seeking motives, such firms will likely have lesser institutional investment on average. Indeed, Li, Oritz-Molina and Zhao [2008] argue that institutional fund managers will not invest in dual-class companies if they believe that these firms are likely to expropriate value from outside investors. Unlike individual investors, institutional managers are subject to "prudence" standards that constrain their investment decisions (Del Guercio [1996] ). What's more, in case of dual-class firms, institutions are unlikely to be able to influence any value-reducing managerial actions due to their lack of control. Thus, we expect lower institutional investment in dual-class firms under the entrenchment hypothesis. In contrast, if the excess control does not reflect entrenchment, then there should be no difference or even higher levels of institutional investment in dual-class firms as compared to single class firms if greater control promotes growth and economic value.
Note that one can argue that there are several reasons why dual-class share structures are not likely to affect institutional investment. First, the empirical evidence on performance differences between dual-and single-class firms is largely inconclusive, and prior studies have documented that institutional investment decisions are primarily driven by past stock returns (Partch [1987] ; Lehn, Netter and Poulsen [1990] ; among others). Second, it is not clear that outside shareholders can be easily expropriated in the U.S by controlling shareholders in dualclass firms, given the existence of very stringent security laws to protect shareholder rights (La Porta et al. [1997] ). Finally, it is possible that institutions cannot avoid stocks that are part of major market indices. These arguments suggest that institutional ownership in dual-class firms might not significantly differ from that in single-class firms. However, we argue that there are also compelling entrenchment and efficiency reasons that are likely to drive institutional investment decisions, and a significant positive or negative relation is likely to support one of these reasons.
As our analysis overlaps with Li, Oritz-Molina and Zhao [2008] , the only other paper that examines the relation between institutional investment and dual-class firms, the major distinction needs to be pointed out. We are interested in the level of institutional investments in classes of shares they can freely trade, most of which are inferior classes (i.e. those without superior voting rights). Therefore, our analysis of institutional ownership is carried out at firm-class level, i.e., institutional ownership is a percentage owned of the total shares outstanding in that class).
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10 As a sensitivity check, we repeat the analysis by restricting to the main class of shares.
In contrast, Li, Oritz-Molina and Zhao [2008] examine the fraction of institutional investment by pooling across the superior and inferior share classes, i.e., calculating institutional ownership by dividing shares owned by total number of shares in all classes. The presence of non-traded shares, however, limits the range of such ratio to less than one making comparisons across firms difficult in our setting. In addition, our preferred focus in on institutional investments in inferior traded shares is for following reasons. First, the incentives and implications of institutions investing in the superior shares are likely to be very different from that of their investments in the shares without these rights. Second, given that most of the superior shares are not traded we cannot make an empirical prediction in their regard. Our analysis is also different from Li et al.
in that we also examine another measure of institutional investment, the number of institutions investing in dual class stocks.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
In this section we first describe the data and then present the summary statistics for the dual-and single-class firms.
Data
We begin with a comprehensive dual-class dataset that covers period 1995-2002. The dataset is built and generously provided by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick [2008] . The most common dual class structure is the 10:1 structure, where the superior class has ten votes per share and the inferior class has one vote per share. They also find that, on average, the insiders of dual class firms own the majority of voting rights (about 60 percent) and the minority of the cash flow rights (about 40 percent). Nearly all of these voting rights come from the superior voting stock (less than fifteen percent of the insiders' voting rights come from the inferior voting stock). While the details on sample construction and description can be obtained from the Gompers et al. paper, a brief discussion of the dual class sample is as follows. Gompers et al. first construct a list of possible members -the "candidate sample" -and then check the SEC filings for each candidate to determine whether it is indeed a dual-class firm. Then they build the candidate sample using data from the Securities Data Company (SDC) (as amended by Jay Ritter), Compustat, CRSP, and the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC).
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The rest of our data comes from several sources. We use Compustat to measure firmlevel capital structure variables. A broad set of control variables is constructed based on the intersection of CRSP and Compustat over the dual-class sample period. We use Thomson 13f (CDA/Spectrum S34) data to construct our institutional ownership variables. 13f institutions include banks, insurance companies, parents of mutual funds, pension funds, university endowments, etc. The institutional ownership is measured quarterly at a security (i.e., firm-class) level. Number of analysts comes from I/B/E/S. We use Dealscan for debt contract-level data and calculate the number of financial covenants, as well as construct other variables based on credit Compustat counts all shares for any class of common stock, a difference between these measures may indicate existence of multiple classes. Thus, if these two share counts differ by more than one percent, Gompers et al. add that company-year to the candidate universe. To get the actual list of dual-class firms (the "dual-class sample") all trusts, closed-end funds, ADRs, units, and REITs are eliminated. Based on the past literature on this topic, Gompers et al. refer to the proxy statements and/or 10Ks to get information on the share ownership for each director, and for all officers and directors as a group (the "insiders"). These disclosures give separate entries for the holdings in each class, and so the dual-class status for the final sample can be definitively determined from these disclosures. 11 The SDC candidates are taken from the Global New Issues Database, which tracks corporate new issues activity since 1970 and flags those issues that have a separate class of common stock. The SDC list is supplemented with amendments from Jay Ritter's website. To find companies with multiple traded share classes, Gompers et al. search the CRSP database for issues with identical six-digit CUSIPs but different two-digit extensions. A further group of candidates are identified from firms listed as dual-class in the IRRC's Corporate Takeover Defenses texts from 1990 to 2002 (1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, and 2002 ).
agreements companies in our sample entered in over the sample period. The initial dual-class sample comprises 4,495 dual class firm-year observations, while the single class sample consists of all other firms with data available on Compustat and CRSP over our sample period.
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The univariate comparisons of the capital structure variables yields the following. We find that dual-class firms are more levered than single-class firms, with significant differences in Since the number of observations varies greatly depending on the type of analysis, we do not restrict our analysis to one sample. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for our sample firms. All variables are defined in detail in Appendix I. Panel A compares dual class to non-dual class firms (the "single class sample"). We present the mean, median, standard deviations for the firm characteristics, and test whether the means and medians are significantly different. The significance in means and medians across two classes is indicated by asterisks following the mean and median numbers for single class firms. Compared to single class firms, dual class firms are larger, have lower growth opportunities, distribute less dividends, have lesser selling, general and administrative expenses as a proportion of sales, are more profitable, have higher returns, have lesser return volatility, lower turnover and lesser analyst coverage. In comparison to single class firms, dual class firms are older, and include more family firms. We control for these differences our multiple regression analyses.
Summary Statistics
proportion of long-term debt (0.35 versus 0.27 in means; 0.36 versus 0.21 in medians). Dual-class firms have longer contract maturities when measured at the facility level (46.77 versus 37.60 months in means; 48 versus 36 months in medians). Dual-class firms have a significantly higher probability of having an active private loan (0.55 versus 0.38 in means; 1.00 versus 0.00 in medians) and have slightly higher use of financial covenants judging by the mean (2.1 versus 1.99) as compared with single-class firms. We also compare the cost of debt for these two groups of firms and find that dual-class firms have significantly lower cost of debt financing than singleclass firms. This supports the notion that debt is a cheaper source of financing for these firms, possibly because of the additional monitoring and restrictions that lenders can impose on insiders.
Dual-class firms also have higher institutional investment. The average (median) fraction of institutional ownership is 0.45 (0.44), while the average (median) fraction of institutional investment in single-class firms is 0.33 (0.28), and both these differences are significant. We obtain analogous set of results for the number of institutions.
In Panel B of Table 1 , we present the summary statistics on the separation between voting and cash flow rights, and board election and cash flow rights for the dual-class firms. The average (median) insider ownership for the sample is 39% (36%), with the average (median) voting control and board control being 21% (20%) and 22% (21%) respectively. We present the correlations between these control mechanisms and the above firm characteristics in Specifically, higher degree of voting-over-cash-flow control rights is associated with significantly higher levels of leverage (both book and market; however, the book leverage is only significantly correlated with voting control), lesser short term debt, greater long term debt, and higher likelihood of having private loans. Greater voting and board control are also significantly correlated with institutional ownership and the number of institutional investors.
Empirical Analyses and Results
In this section we test our hypotheses in a multiple regression setting. We first discuss the relation between capital structure choices and disproportional control mechanisms in dual-class firms. Subsequently we proceed with the analysis of institutional investment. The dependent variables and control variables used in our tests are described in Appendices I and II.
Dual-Class Firms and Capital Structure Decisions

Research Design
We begin by investigating the association between leverage and the presence of dualclass ownership and the control enhancing mechanisms in dual-class firms. We estimate the following regression: 
Leverage is defined as either book leverage (LEV_BK) or the market value leverage (LEV_MKT) and the control variables are chosen based on determinants of leverage in prior studies (e.g., Berger, Ofek and Yermack [1997] ; Frank and Goyal [2005] ). The DUALCLASS_VARIABLE stands for either a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is a dualclass firm, and 0 otherwise (DUAL_CLASS), or it represents the degree of separation between ownership and control in dual-class firms. In the later case the sample is limited to dual-class firms. We focus on two sources of control: the traditional difference or wedge between voting and cash flow rights (referred to as voting control), and the wedge between board election rights and cash flow rights (referred to as board control).
14 allowing the holder of the dual-class stock to elect a fraction of the board of directors that exceeds their vote as well as their share ownership.
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the above regressions by using the ratio of voting rights and cash flow rights (RATIO_VT_OWN) and the ratio of board election rights and cash flow rights (RATIO_BD_OWN) to address the potential concern that the results might be sensitive to the functional form of the control mechanisms. All of our results are qualitatively unchanged on using this alternative specification. 15 Amit and Villalonga [2008] is the only other paper that examines board election rights in addition to the other common forms of control on firm value, arguing that the effects are likely to be sensitive to the source of the control.
We examine the two wedges because the capital structure is likely to vary with the extent of disproportional control enjoyed by the insiders. The entrenchment theory predicts a negative coefficient for the DUAL_CLASS variable and the two control mechanisms, voting control (VT_OWN) and board control (BD_OWN).
To control for firm attributes that are likely to influence leverage, we include firm size (SIZE), growth opportunities (BTM), dividends declared (DIV), volatility of returns (STD_RET) and profitability (ROA). As in Berger, Ofek and Yermack [1997] , we control for non-debt tax effects by using the ratio of investment tax credits over total assets (TAX_CRED), asset intensity as measured by the ratio of net property, plant and equipment over total assets (ASS_INT), and two variables measuring asset uniqueness, namely research and development expense over sales (R&D), and selling, general and administrative expenses (SGA). In addition, given that a majority of dual-class firms are family firms, we collect data on whether firms in our sample are named after their founders as a proxy for family control (FAMILY). We also include the age of the firm as a control (FIRM_AGE), to the extent that the generation of the family may be related to their leverage decisions. In the regressions with the two control mechanisms (VT_OWN and BD_VT),
we also include the cash flow ownership of insiders (INSIDER_OWN) following Amit and Villalonga [2008] and Gompers et al. [2008] .
Next, we examine whether there exists a significant relation between control mechanisms in dual-class firms and reliance on current vs. long term debt by estimating the following regression: 
where the dependant variable is either short term debt (ST_DT) or long term debt (LT_DT). As in the previous case, we repeat the regressions using the DUAL_CLASS dummy variable as well as the two control mechanisms in dual-class firms. All our control variables in equation (2) We also examine whether dual-class firms (and the control mechanisms in these firms) are associated with likelihood of having private debt and whether the debt in these firms are associated with more financial covenants. We model the probability of having an active bank loan by estimating the following probit regression:
The dependent variable, PVT, is a dummy variable that equals 1 if there exists at least one bank loan in a particular year. The controls variables include firm size, book to market, return on assets, leverage and asset intensity, and are consistent with Rauh and Sufi [2009] . In addition to these standard variables, we include the dummy variable proxying for family firm (FAMILY) and the age of the firm (FIRM_AGE) to control for the presence of family firms and their generation on this capital structure decision.
Finally, we examine whether significant associations exist between dual class ownership and the number of financial covenants: 
where the dependant variable, FIN_COV, is the number of financial covenants present in private debt contracts. We control for macroeconomic factors, loan features and firm characteristics consistent with prior studies (Frankel and Litov [2007] ). We obtain the macroeconomic variables from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) website. The variable TERM_SPREAD is the yield difference between the 10-year treasury bonds and the 2-year treasury bonds, and CREDIT_SPREAD is the yield difference between AAA corporate bonds and BAA corporate bonds. We include controls for the loan size, loan maturity, and the number of non-financial covenants. Among the firm characteristics, we control for firm size, book to market, profitability, leverage, asset intensity, family firms and the age of the firm.
Endogeneity
Most studies on dual-class firms have dealt with the relation between dual-class stock and firm value or performance (e.g. Tobin's q) where endogeneity of ownership structures becomes a central issue. Demsetz and Lehn [1985] propose that ownership structures vary systematically between firms due to differences in the contracting environment in ways that are consistent with firm value maximization. Consistent with this, Himmelberg et al. [1999] find that managerial ownership is strongly influenced by both observable firm characteristics and unobserved firm heterogeneity (firm fixed effects) in the contracting environment. Once observed firm characteristics and firm fixed effects have been controlled for, they find no exogenous effect of managerial ownership on firm value.
We acknowledge that endogeneity potentially applies to our setting too. However, we note that most firms in our sample had dual-class structures in place since their IPOs, and these have little variation over time. Thus the reverse causation argument, implying that the choice of subsequent financing affected the choice of dual-class structures, is less likely to be an issue in our setting. 17 There are also likely to be differences in the contracting environment of dual-and single-class firms that drive capital structure choices. To control for this type of endogeneity problems, we include a set of observable firm characteristics (described above), which we consider to be good proxies for differences in individual firms' business conditions and contracting environment. As in Cronqvist and Nillson [2003] , we also include a set of time dummies to control for general changes in market conditions as well as include industry dummies to account for variations in ownership structures across industries. However, we cannot include firm fixed effects in our regressions due to absence of within-firm variation in the dual-class sample (or its lack). We present the results of the various aspects of capital structure decisions in the following sub-sections.
18 17 We also repeat our analyses with a constant sample of firms throughout the sample period and as expected, our results remain unchanged. 18 We present the full sample results which compares the dual class firms with all single class firms over the sample period. However, our results are robust to using a matched sample of single class firms, where we match by size, year and industry. We report the full sample results as we have a larger number of observations. Table 3 presents regression results based on leverage as a dependent variable. Columns
Leverage
(1) and (2) provide estimates for the relation between book leverage, market leverage and dualclass indicator variable, while the four columns (3) through (6) describe the relation between book and market leverage and the excess of voting and board over economic ownership. The results in columns (1) and (2) suggest that the coefficient on DUAL_CLASS dummy is positive and significant both for book and market leverage. When we consider the individual sources of control, we find that the wedge between voting and cash flow rights is positive and significantly associated both with book and market leverage. Board control is also positively associated with book and market leverage, but these results are not significant. This evidence that dual-class firms are likely to choose greater levels of debt generally does not support the entrenchment explanation for dual-class ownership.
The results for the control variables are generally consistent with prior studies. In general, larger and less profitable firms on average have significantly higher levels of leverage. The proxy for growth, BTM, is significantly positively associated with market leverage, implying that firms with lower growth opportunities have higher levels of leverage. However, the results are opposite in sign in the case of book leverage. Asset intensity is negative and significant only in the case of market leverage. Similar to prior studies we find that SGA is negative and significant; however, the second proxy for asset uniqueness R&D is positive and significant. The latter is inconsistent with the evidence in prior studies. One possible explanation is the argument in Frank and Goyal [2005] that R&D is also likely to be proxying for intangible assets such as patents and contractual rights many of which can be pledged to support debt, which is consistent with a positive association. Sample firms with higher variance of stock returns use more leverage. Finally, family firms and older firms are associated with higher levels of leverage. Table 4 presents the results for the mix of liabilities. As before, the first two columns are based on full sample of dual-class and single-class firms, while the next four columns focus on dual-class firms (where the first two columns present the results for voting control and the next two columns present the results for board control). We find that dual-class firms have significantly lower levels of short-term debt and significantly higher levels of long-term debt.
Maturity
Within the dual-class firms, firms with greater voting control of insiders have lower levels of short term debt and higher levels of long term debt. We obtain similar results for board control, but these results are not significant. While, it is difficult to distinguish between efficiency vs. rent-seeking view based on maturity alone, our results on private debt and financial covenants in conjunction with the maturity results have higher potential to provide conclusive evidence.
Among the control variables, larger, more levered, more profitable, and lower growth firms have significantly more long term debt and less short term debt. Firms that pay more dividends generally have lower levels of long term debt. Firms with more tangible assets and less research and development expenses have higher levels of short term debt and lower levels of long term debt. Firms with higher tax credit rely on longer term debt while firms with higher volatility to use higher fractions of short term debt.
Private Debt
The results of the probit analysis for private debt are presented in Table 5 . We find that the probability of having a bank loan at any point in time is significantly higher in dual-class firms as compared to single class firms. Within the dual-class firms, firms with greater divergence of voting (or board election) and cash flow rights are more likely to have a bank loan; the result is only significant in case of board election rights. Given that private loans are likely to have stricter monitoring and more restrictive covenants, insider entrenchment is unlikely to explain this result, because of additional monitoring and tighter control (possibly used as a signaling device).
For both the full sample and the dual-class sample, we find that larger firms are more likely to have more private debt. As in Rauh and Sufi [2009] , we find that more profitable firms are more likely to have bank loans. We find a negative and significant association with book to market, indicating that firms with more growth opportunities are more likely to have a private bank loan. One explanation for this can be that high growth firms are likely to have more agency costs and therefore value additional monitoring by the bank (Bolton and Freixas [2000] ). Larger firms with more leverage are also more likely to have a loan. Older firms and firms with more tangible assets are also more likely to have a loan, but these variables are not significant for the regressions with the two control variables. Finally, family firms have higher likelihood of having a bank loan.
Financial Covenants
The results related to financial covenants are presented in Table 6 . Although marginally significant, we find evidence that dual-class firms have higher number of financial covenants as compared with single class firms. Within the dual-class sample, firms with greater board control also have more financial covenants. The relation between financial covenants and voting control is positive but insignificant. We interpret these results together with the evidence on private loans and debt maturity as refuting the hypothesis that insiders in dual-class firms take decisions that are likely to enable them to expropriate value.
The evidence on the firm characteristics suggests that smaller firms have more financial covenants, and firms that have more financial covenants also have more non-financial covenants.
We find that dual-class firms with higher growth opportunities and less profitable firms have fewer covenants. As expected, firms with higher leverage exhibit more covenants, although this is not significant for the regressions with the control mechanisms. For the dual-class sample, firms with higher facility amounts are also likely to rely on more covenants, which is also consistent with the result that more leverage is related to more covenants. We also find a positive relation between the maturity of the facility and the number of covenants, although this relation is not significant for the regressions with the control mechanisms. The results with respect to other variables are generally insignificant.
To summarize this section, our evidence indicates that dual-class firms and wider wedge between voting rights (and board election rights) and economic ownership are associated with significantly higher levels of leverage, longer term debt, lower fraction of current liabilities, greater probability of having private debt, and more financial covenants. Collectively, these results support the efficiency hypothesis, where insiders with more control opt for debt financing with more restrictions on their actions. In the next section we corroborate our inference by examining sophisticated investors and their preference to invest in dual-class stocks.
Dual-Class Firms and Institutional Investment
We examine whether dual-class firms, and the sources of control in such firms, have significant associations with the decisions made by an independent group of economic agents, 
The dependant variable is the fraction of institutional ownership in a firm. We also repeat the analysis using the natural logarithm of the number of institutional investors in a firm (L_#INST). We repeat regression (5) within the dual-class firms by replacing the DUAL_CLASS dummy variable by the extent of voting and board control. All the control variables we include are the firm and stock characteristics that were previously shown to determine institutional investment (Li, Oritz-Molina and Zhao [2008] ). Table 7 presents the results for the full sample (first two columns) as well as the dual-class sample (next four columns). The results both for fraction of ownership and the number of institutions are similar, and thus we discuss results on INST_FRAC only (and point out the differences in results for L_#INST, if any). The results reveal that dual-class firms have significantly higher levels of institutional investment as compared to single class firms. Within the dual-class firms, firms with both greater voting control and greater board control have significantly higher levels of institutional investment. This is inconsistent with the evidence in Li et al. [2008] . However, as discussed earlier in Section 2, their result that institutional investment is lower in dual-class firms is likely to be mechanically driven by their variable measurement technique. Our results also hold when we examine the relation with the number of institutions investing in dual-class firms. Our evidence that institutions invest more heavily in the inferior shares of dual-class firms versus single class firms (which is increasing in the degree of the control mechanisms) suggests that the decisions taken by the controlling insiders are more likely to be value enhancing decisions, as perceived by institutions.
The results for the control variables generally conform to those documented in prior studies. Institutional investment is significantly higher for larger firms, older firms, firms with lower prior year returns, lower dividend yields (this is positive and significant, however, for L_#INST in the case of the two control mechanisms), lower return volatility (although this relation is positive and significant for L_#INST), higher turnover, lower growth, higher leverage, higher stock prices, and greater analyst coverage. The dummy variable, FAMILY, is also mostly positive and significant indicating that institutions are more likely to invest in family firms.
Conclusion
We investigate whether dual-class ownership and the extent of the separation of voting rights as well as board election rights from cash flows rights in dual-class firms is related to capital structure choices and choices of institutional ownership. Our objective is to understand whether various aspects of capital structure choices are consistent with insider entrenchment or with insiders making efficient financing choices. In contrast to the predictions of the entrenchment hypothesis, we document that excess control in dual-class shares is related to higher both book and market leverage. Additionally, in comparison to single class firms we find that dual-class firms have significantly higher levels of longer term debt, lower levels of debt in current liabilities, are more likely to have private loans outstanding, and rely on financial covenants more extensively. Further, we document that dual-class firms have significantly higher
institutional investment in what's likely to be the inferior shares. Taken together, our results support the argument that on average control mechanisms in dual-class firms are associated with insiders taking actions that enhance firm value.
The literature has been inconclusive regarding the overall implications of disproportional control. There is some evidence that concentrated control has a negative relationship with the value of outside equity. However, there is also some evidence of no effects and some evidence of positive effects. Given the difficulty in interpreting these valuation implications, we attempt to understand entrenchment versus efficiency motives of controlling insiders in dual-class firms by examining their decisions that are likely to reflect these alternative motives. We contribute to the literature by providing evidence that supports the conjecture that on average control enhancing mechanisms in dual-class firms are more consistent with being an efficient governance choice, rather than a reflection of insider entrenchment.
APPENDIX I: VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS FOR ALL FIRMS Category Variable description (Name) Measurement
Firm Characteristics
The existence of dual class stock in a firm. (DUAL_CLASS)
A dummy variable which equals 1 if a firm has dual-class stock ownership structure, and 0 otherwise.
Size of the firm. (SIZE)
The natural logarithm of the market capitalization of the firm, which is the product of the number of shares outstanding and year closing price per share.
Growth opportunities for the firm.
(BTM)
The book value of equity divided by the market value of equity.
Dividends declared by the firms.
(DIV)
The ratio of common dividends declared divided by market capitalization.
Asset intensity. (ASS_INT)
The ratio of total net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets.
Asset uniqueness. (R&D)
The ratio of research and development expenses divided by sales.
Asset uniqueness. (SGA)
The ratio of selling, general and administrative expenses divided by sales.
Non-interest tax shields.
(TAX_CRED)
The ratio of investment tax credits divided by total assets.
Stock return volatility. (STD_RET)
The volatility of monthly stock returns over the prior year.
Age of the firm. (FIRM_AGE)
The number of years since the first year the borrower has data on CRSP/Compustat merged database.
The operating performance of the firm. (ROA)
The operating income before depreciation divided by average total assets of the firm, adjusted for the industry as measured by the two-digit SIC code.
Family firm. (FAMILY)
A dummy variable which equals 1 if a firm's name has a person's last name in it.
Stock returns (RETURN)
The average monthly stock returns over prior year.
Share turnover (TURNOVER)
The ratio of trading volume to the number of shares outstanding at the end of the prior year.
Share price (PRICE) The logarithm of closing price at year end.
Number of analysts (ANAL_FOLL)
The logarithm of the number of analysts covering the firm.
S&P index membership (S&P)
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is in the S&P 500 index.
APPENDIX I: VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS FOR ALL FIRMS (CONTD.)
Leverage Variables
The book leverage of the firm.
The total liabilities held by the firm divided by the book value of assets. The market leverage of the firm. 
APPENDIX II: MEASUREMENT OF CONTROL MECHANISMS IN DUAL-CLASS FIRMS
We adopt the measurements of the control mechanisms in dual class firms based on Amit and Villalonga [2007] , which is also generally consistent with the literature in this area. We label and define the different concepts as follows: 
NO. OF OBS 2,849
This table presents the summary statistics for the dual-class and single-class firms in panel A and the summary statistics for the control mechanisms in dual-class firms in panel B. the firm, institutional investment and capital structure variables are defined as follows. SIZE is the natural logarithm of market capitalization; BTM is the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity; DIV is the ratio of the common dividends declared divided by the market capitalization; ASS_INT is the ratio of net property, plant and equipment to total assets; R&D is the ratio of research and development expenditures to sales; SGA is the ratio of selling, general and administrative expenses to sales; ROA is the operating income before depreciation divided by average total assets; RETURN is the average monthly returns over the prior year; STD_RET is the variance of monthly stock returns over the prior year; TURNOVER is the ratio of trading volume to shares outstanding at the end of the prior year; TAX_CRED is the ratio of investment tax credits to total assets; ANAL_FOLL is the logarithm of the number of analysts following the firm; FIRM_AGE is the number of years since the first year the firm appears on Compustat; FAMILY is a dummy variable that equals 1 if family name is present in the name of a firm; INST_FRAC is the total shares held by institutional investors divided by total shares outstanding of the firm; L_#INST is the logarithm of the number of institutional investors in the firm; LEV_BK is the total debt held by the firm divided by the book value of assets of the firm; LEV_MKT is the total debt held by the firm divided by the market value of equity plus the book value of liabilities; ST_DT is the ratio of short term debt divided by total liabilities; LT_DT is the ratio of long term debt over total liabilities; PVT is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has a bank loan contract in the year; FACILITY_MAT is the logarithm of the maturity of the facility measured in months; ALL_IN_DRAWN is the amount the borrower pays in basis points over LIBOR for each dollar drawn down. The variables in the dual-class sample are defined as follows. INSIDER_OWN measures the cash flow rights of the holders of dual-class stock; VT_OWN is the difference between voting rights and cash flow rights; BD_OWN is the difference between board election rights and cash flow rights. This table presents the Pearson correlations between the control variables in dual-class firms and the firm, capital structure and institutional investment variables. INSIDER_OWN measures the cash flow rights of the holders of dual-class stock; VT_OWN is the difference between voting rights and cash flow rights; BD_OWN is the difference between board election rights and cash flow rights; SIZE is measured as the natural logarithm of market capitalization; BTM is the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity; DIV is the ratio of the common dividends declared divided by the market capitalization; ASS_INT is the ratio of net property, plant and equipment to total assets; R&D is the ratio of research and development expenditures to sales; SGA is the ratio of selling, general and administrative expenses to sales; ROA is the operating income before depreciation divided by average total assets; RETURN is the average monthly returns over the prior year; STD_RET is the variance of monthly stock returns over the prior year; TURNOVER is the ratio of trading volume to shares outstanding at the end of the prior year; TAX_CRED is the ratio of investment tax credits to total assets; ANAL_FOLL is the logarithm of the number of analysts following the firm; FIRM_AGE is the number of years since the first year the firm appears on Compustat; FAMILY is a dummy variable that equals 1 if family name is present in the name of the firm; INST_FRAC is the total shares held by institutional investors divided by total shares outstanding of the firm; L_#INST is the logarithm of the number of institutional investors in the firm; LEV_BK is the total debt held by the firm divided by the book value of assets of the firm; LEV_MKT is the total debt held by the firm divided by the market value of equity plus the book value of liabilities; ST_DT is the ratio of short term debt divided by total liabilities; LT_DT is the ratio of long term debt over total liabilities; PVT is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has a bank loan contract in the year; FACILITY_MAT is the logarithm of the maturity of the facility measured in months; ALL_IN_DRAWN is the amount the borrower pays in basis points over LIBOR for each dollar drawn down. For the regression with the wedges, the variable INSIDER_OWN is included as a control as well. The dependent and independent variables are defined as follows. LEV_BK is the ratio of the total debt to the book value of equity; LEV_MKT is the ratio of the total debt to the market value of equity for the year; DUAL_CLASS is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm has dual-class stock, and 0 otherwise; VT_OWN is the difference between voting rights and cash flow rights; BD_OWN is the difference between board election rights and cash flow rights; INSIDER_OWN measures the cash flow rights of the holders of dual-class stock; SIZE is measured as the natural logarithm of market capitalization; BTM is the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity; DIV is the ratio of the common dividends declared divided by the market capitalization; ROA is the operating income before depreciation divided by average total assets; ASS_INT is the ratio of net property, plant and equipment to total assets; R&D is the ratio of research and development expenditures to sales; TAX_CRED is the ratio of investment tax credits to total assets; SGA is the ratio of selling, general and administrative expenses to sales; STD_RET is the variance of monthly stock returns over the prior year; FIRM_AGE is the number of years since the first year the firm appears on Compustat; FAMILY is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a family name is present in the name of a firm. The dependent and independent variables are defined as follows. ST_DT is the ratio of total short term debt to total liabilities; LT_DT is the ratio of total long term debt to total liabilities; DUAL_CLASS is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm has dual-class stock, and 0 otherwise; VT_OWN is the difference between voting rights and cash flow rights; BD_OWN is the difference between board election rights and cash flow rights; INSIDER_OWN measures the cash flow rights of the holders of dual-class stock; SIZE is measured as the natural logarithm of market capitalization; BTM is the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity; DIV is the ratio of the common dividends declared divided by the market capitalization; ROA is the operating income before depreciation divided by average total assets; LEV is the ratio of the total debt to the book value of equity; ASS_INT is the ratio of net property, plant and equipment to total assets; R&D is the ratio of research and development expenditures to sales; TAX_CRED is the ratio of investment tax credits to total assets; SGA is the ratio of selling, general and administrative expenses to sales; STD_RET is the variance of monthly stock returns over the prior year; FIRM_AGE is the number of years since the first year the firm appears on Compustat; FAMILY is a dummy variable that equals 1 if family name is present in the name of a firm. This table presents the results for the number of financial covenants for dual-class firms versus single-class firms, as well as for the two control mechanisms present in dual class firms, namely voting control and disproportional board representation. The dependent variable is the number of financial covenants (FIN_COV). The independent variable (DUALCLASS_VARIABLE) is either the dummy variable DUAL_CLASS or one of the control mechanisms, VOTE_OWN or BD_OWN. For the wedge regressions, the variable INSIDER_OWN is included as well.
TABLE 6 CONTD.
The dependent and independent variables are defined as follows. FIN_COV is the number of financial covenants measured at the package level; DUAL_CLASS is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm has dual-class stock, and 0 otherwise; VT_OWN is the difference between voting rights and cash flow rights; BD_OWN is the difference between board election rights and cash flow rights; INSIDER_OWN measures the cash flow rights of the holders of dual-class stock; TERM_SPREAD is the difference between the 10-year treasury constant maturity rate and the 2-year treasury constant maturity rate; CREDIT_SPREAD is the difference between the AAA corporate bond yield and BAA corporate bond yield; FACILITY_AMT is the logarithm of the loan facility amount; FACILITY_MAT is the logarithm of the loan maturity of the facility in months; NONFIN_COV is the number of non-financial covenants measured at the package level; SIZE is measured as the natural logarithm of market capitalization; BTM is the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity; ROA is the operating income before depreciation divided by the average total assets; ASS_INT is the ratio of the net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets; LEV is the total debt divided by the book value of assets; FIRM_AGE is the number of years since the first year when the borrower had data available in CRSP; FAMILY is a dummy variable that equals 1 if family name is present in the name of a firm. The dependent and independent variables are defined as follows. INST_INVST is the total shares held by institutions as a proportion of the total shares outstanding; L_#INST is the logarithm of the number of institutional investors in the firm; DUAL_CLASS is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm has dual-class stock, and 0 otherwise; VT_OWN is the difference between voting rights and cash flow rights; BD_OWN is the difference between board election rights and cash flow rights; INSIDER_OWN measures the cash flow rights of the holders of dual-class stock; SIZE is measured as the natural logarithm of market capitalization; BTM is the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity; LEV is the total debt divided by the book value of assets; DIV is the ratio of the common dividends declared divided by the market capitalization; ROA is the operating income before depreciation divided by the average total assets of the firm; PRICE is the logarithm of the closing price at the end of the year; RETURN is the average monthly stock returns over the year; TURNOVER is the ratio of the trading volume to the number of shares outstanding at the end of the year; STD_RET is the volatility of monthly stock returns over the prior year; S&P is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is a member of the S&P 500 index; ANAL_FOLL is the logarithm of the number of analysts covering the firm; FIRM_AGE is the number of years since the first year that the borrower has data on CRSP; FAMILY is a dummy variable that equals 1 if family name is present in the name of a firm.
